1 At least that is the impression one gets from reading the press and specialised international law blogs. The question is, however, whether such conclusions are premature or are depicting an exaggerated picture of the state of international legal affairs.
Drawing on a set of case studies of resistance to ICs across the world, this special issue provides a first ever comparative empirical assessment of instances and types of resistance to ICs.
The objective is both theoretical and empirical. Appellate Body (Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch 2018) , our emphasis is generally on regional international courts in the areas of trade and human rights. This emphasis allows us to make general conclusion that are valid at least with regard to such regional institutions. But as the framing article suggests, the forms of resistance to global courts do no seemingly deviate from regional ICs.
A first major conclusion from our inquiry is that cases of backlash in terms of an assault on ICs seeking to diminish or obliterate their authority are very scarce. Many writings on backlash to
ICs start with the example of the SADC Tribunal and its suspension in the wake of a ruling on land rights in Zimbabwe. Our inquiry suggests that the case of the SADC Tribunal is in fact an outlier and not representative of the general situation of ICs and the forms and patterns of resistance they face and have faced. Therefore, understanding resistance to ICs require a different starting-point that the extreme case of the SADC Tribunal. We suggest that it requires first a theoretical refinement of the framework of understanding that does not aggregate all resistance to ICs as backlash as suggested by the opening article. Second, we suggest that it is necessary to take a comparative view of resistance to ICs and one that includes contextual and empirical study of ICs. And, consequently, we note that sweeping and more normative statements about a world "renationalizing" with grave consequences
for multilateral institutions like ICs should be nuanced in view of actual empirical studies.
We do not find many instances of backlash, but we do find many instances of pushback;
that is, instances of resistance to ICs that is not challenging the authority of ICs, but rather the directions of its case law and jurisprudence. Our inquiry suggests that such pushback should not always to be regarded as an existential threat to ICs and their operation. In light of the fact that pushback is a continuously occurring phenomenon and that most ICs survive such critical interfaces with their audiences, we suggest that it is better seen as part of the operation of ICs. Pushback is in fact integral to ICs; that is, it is inherent to the functioning of modern international legal regimes rather that the source of their destruction. In that sense, it becomes the counterpart of authority building of ICs.
We will argue that this has two main explanations. First, critique of law and participation in debate about legal change is part of all legal systems. International legal systems are not different in this regard. Second, in light of the absence of conventional checks and balances in international legal systems, some of the debate that are channelled into parliamentary arenas and legitimate democratic discourse more generally in domestic systems, will in the case of ICs occur via different channels due to the absence -in most cases -of such deliberative arenas. A key to the improvement of judicialised international regimes is therefore the need for rethinking how legitimate critique is channelled into the right fora in order to avoid it transforming into backlash and thereby no longer a critique of law but a critique of the institutional authority of ICs.
In view of these findings, what can we say about the more general state of affairs of the international legal system? Considering our observation of limited backlash but continuously occurring pushback, we cannot support the more alarmist writings about stating the end of ICs. One of the reasons for the continuous existence of ICs, notwithstanding backlash and pushback, is probably the functional need for ICs and other global institutions capable of settling conflicts over international rules and transactions. This certainly seems to be the case with regard to international trade. Although, the United States currently is pursuing a more unilateral "America First" foreign policy, most major economies of the world are still supportive of international regulation in the area, including various forms of dispute resolution bodies such as ICs. We will not claim that ICs are the only way of solving such issues. As any other institutional innovation, they adapt and transform over time, but the core idea -and demand -for international dispute resolution does not seem to be overall declining in this area.
International human rights is naturally a slightly different matter. The paradox -to some -is that it is an international legal regime in which states bestow upon themselves an external international control. Seen in this perspective, it is indeed surprising that we find ICs in the area of human rights. But some scholars have, however, also pointed out that human rights are not simply a question of self-binding via external control (Moravcsik 2000) . It is also, and above all, about lockingin certain value sets of geopolitical importance. The ECtHR, for example, was originally produced as a Cold War instrument (Madsen 2007) . In more recent times, notably since the 1990s, it has adapted to geopolitical changes and effectively turned into a key institution with regard to the democratisation of the wider Europe. Similarly, the IACtHR has complex historical origins in the Cold War but has also transformed itself into an important institution of democratic consolidation in Latin America. The creation of the ACtHPR was also in part triggered by the new geopolitical conditions of the late 1990s (Viljoen 2004) .
. All of this suggests that geopolitical conditions matter to those courts, just as trade liberalism has mattered to ICs adjudicating global and regional economic matters. The movement in favour of the international rule of law and democratisation might be already past its peak, but the effects of increased globalisation over the past decades have nevertheless created a structural demand for legal capacity at the regional and global levels. Today we find visible resistance to these global developments and its institutions, but this inquiry does not support the claim that this resistance is generally undermining ICs. What it does suggest, however, is that many ICs lack adequate channels for voicing disagreement. Even courts, including ICs, have to adapt over time to the new realities of their contexts of operation. But that adaptation is best done incrementally and as part of continuous debate -not by assault on the institutional authority of ICs.
